The meager, vague, and traditional statement issued by the PCC after the third plenum can be scrutinized under two different lenses. The hopes of people expecting epochal announcements were ignored. Maybe expectations were also inflated by the Central Committee’s internal environment; certainly, the media’s expectations had grown in an unprecedented manner. It seemed like the plenum was some kind of US convention to select the next candidate for the White House. Instead, the summit took place in a Beijing hotel and nothing has leaked from the 350 delegates so far. The official announcement is effectively devoid of new developments, at least those anticipated by the public. There are implications but no actual commitments to reform legal protections for markets and property rights. Certain central economic subjects are practically not even mentioned, such as local finance and the internationalization of the reminbi. International politics are absent, and therefore a new role for China isn’t even hypothesized, which doesn’t seem ready to take on the responsibilities demanded by its dimensions. So, anyone with excessive illusions seems disappointed. In any case, it would be a mistake to dismiss the plenum as a stalemate. Certain important positions appear strengthened when the conclusions are examined carefully. Corruption is identified as an enemy that must be eradicated, while agricultural property—especially belonging to small-time farmers—will be granted and protected. Above all, in the most important passage, the PCC affirms that the market will have to play a decisive role in the distribution of resources and that the “principal task is to strengthen the relationship between the state and the markets.” Skeptics can consider this a generic assertion, but having it highlighted and approved has a relevant significance. It is likely Xi Jin Ping’s most important political victory. The secretary knows very well that the relationship between the state and markets is opaque, unproductive and a refuge for hidden special interests. The true obstacle to the second phase of China’s economy lies there. This is the new policy’s target, which is currently not strong enough to assert itself. For this reason, the administration is limited to announcements. The goal is to make developments grow from this platform: Xi’s acuity and qualities will be measured on this field. Therefore, whoever expected headlines from the plenum has reason to be disappointed; but whoever expected a prudent and realistic conclusion proved to be a more careful observer. Today, China is unable to beat its wings because the flight that enabled its takeoff made it seem efficient and indisputable. Therefore, the plenum produced the only result it could produce.