China is amused by the apparent resurgence of nationalism in Europe. It’s not complaining, it uses the nationalism to its advantage and reinforces its convictions on bilateralism. Beijing doesn’t believe in ideological visions of foreign policy, which it believes should be enslaved completely to a country’s material interests. It doesn’t subscribe to any institution that limits its sovereignty; for this reason, it doesn’t feel remorse if the UN seems like an impotent instrument, pervaded with rhetoric. According to the Chinese, the national state cannot surrender power, if not at risk of its own survival. Because of this, China is not surprised by the stagnation in Europe’s integration. The economic crisis has raised doubts regarding the validity of Brussels’s experiment. Many citizens view Europe as a burden, an intrusion on internal politics, an external obstacle that’s hard and difficult to manage. Beijing doesn’t suffer from these problems, and in any case, it prefers to dialogue with individual states rather than a communal bureaucracy. It is known that Berlin—not Brussels—is the most courted capital. Regardless, the EU remains an indispensible partner for China. They can’t forget its dimensions (the biggest GDP in the world), immense production capacity, and the elevated consumption of Chinese merchandise. Furthermore, recently but no less importantly, China is studying its internal dynamics. The conclusions are ironic and promising at the same time. Right at the same historical time as the affirmation of China’s market economy and the division of two European blocks, dominant politics seem headed toward the division of objectives rather than their union. In addition, the United States—the advocates of that affirmation—detect a plurality in their position that would have been considered a concession during the Cold War. As if there had been a realignment after the ideological victory, the European front demonstrates some unexpected developments. The latest G20 in St. Petersburg has underscored strong divisions over the Syrian conflict. Only France has openly aligned itself with the US, while the other European partners—especially the United Kingdom—demonstrated a range of diversity. One of Washington’s old cornerstones, namely holding off Germany, seems to have been denied by Berlin’s economic strength. If politics wane and economics dominate, it will consequently favor Germany’s acquisition of a more central role via a number of different routes. The last paradox is Russia’s power of influence. If Russia was politically and militarily feared before, now its conditional opening affords it a decisive role in energetic and territorial equilibriums. The G20 summit’s failure is the latest confirmation. In this picture, China isn’t disoriented. It’s a continental power, it has no ambition to conquer but is interested only in security, and it gleans strength from a system of globalization in which fragmentation and division prevail. In these cases, it can assert its strength and success. It is, however, a position that will inevitably need to be reconsidered. Limiting the consideration of international politics to a sum of markets and supplies (a destination for goods and source of raw materials) is a position that cannot be maintained indefinitely. It’s true that Beijing’s scenario is confusing and disorienting, but myopia will not provide a solution for a great power like China.